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**THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE**

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

National Intelligence Officers

NFAC #2399-81/1  
23 April 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence  
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

THROUGH : Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment  
National Intelligence Officer for Warning

FROM : Acting National Intelligence Officer for Africa

SUBJECT : Warning Report: Sub-Saharan Africa (U)

1. Action Requested: None; the attached report is for your information. (U)

2. Background: Community representatives and specialists met on 21 April 1981 with the A/NIO/AF as chairman. The attached report has not been coordinated with the other participants, but is being circulated to them. If they feel their views have been misinterpreted, or if they have significant additional concerns, I'll report further to you. (U)

Attachment  
NFAC #2399-81

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## WARNING REPORT: SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA\* No. 30

CHAD

The Nigerians have reluctantly concluded that the Libyans are in Chad to stay. With the Nigerians backing off their attempt to lead an African campaign to oust the Libyans, there is no diplomatic effort under way against Qadhafi by his opponents in Sub-Saharan Africa. Qadhafi is busy consolidating the Libyan position and is actively trying to influence African leaders to support him at the OAU summit this summer. At the same time, evidence continues to accumulate that the Libyans are trying to mount subversive efforts in other countries in the region, particularly against President Kountche of Niger. This will prove a challenge to the French who are supporting Kountche. (S)

Meanwhile, Habre's forces continue their guerrilla activity against the Libyan occupation forces. There has been no indication of significant military activity by Habre in the past few weeks. Aid from his outside supporters continues, but Habre apparently is encountering bottlenecks in moving the equipment into Chad. (S)

MAURITANIA

The sudden visit to Mauritania early this week by Qadhafi following the Moroccan-backed coup attempt against the government in Nouakchott has raised serious concern about Libyan involvement in Mauritania and how this might affect the Western Saharan problem. We will be watching this development in the next few weeks and examining developments in Mauritania more closely at the next warning meeting. (S)

UGANDA

The internal situation continues to deteriorate. A critical period will come this summer when President Nyerere withdraws the Tanzanian troops from Uganda. Analysts are concerned that the country could become even more destabilized than it is already. Although Nyerere seems determined now to go through with the withdrawal, there may still be a chance he might reverse himself if he sees only total chaos in Uganda as the alternative to remaining. (S)

\*This memorandum is one of a series produced monthly by NIO/AF. Its purpose is to review possible developments in the short-term future that would be damaging to US interests. Obviously, many of these developments will not occur in the time frame or in the manner suggested, or will not occur at all.

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A chaotic internal situation would increase the opportunities for outside meddling, perhaps by the Soviets. Some of Obote's opponents have been casting about for Libyan aid, but it is not clear that the Libyans, or the Soviets, favor any of the opposition groups at this time. Nevertheless, analysts are worried that further instability might have regional implications that spell problems for Sudan and Kenya, thereby making the region more attractive to the Soviets. (S)

ZIMBABWE

Despite the success of Prime Minister Mugabe in steering Zimbabwe along a moderate course over the past year, the disarming of ZAPU guerrillas remains a troublesome problem for his government. Die-hard ZAPU insurgents who perceive that their party leaders are gradually losing influence in the government could create security problems for Mugabe. ZAPU apparently has arms hidden away in rural areas, and some of the diehards appear willing to take to the bush and use the arms. (S)

Mugabe worries about South Africa training anti-Zimbabwe dissidents. While it is not clear that South Africa is actually conducting training activity on as large a scale as Mugabe suggests, in light of Pretoria's constant concern with its national security, such a development cannot be ruled out. In view of the reports that Mugabe has allowed the anti-South African ANC and PAC nationalist groups to carry on some activities in Zimbabwe, South African perceptions of a developing threat from Zimbabwe could provoke warnings from Pretoria to Mugabe and eventually lead to economic and other pressures being applied to Zimbabwe in the future. (S)

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